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Abstract  
We propose to validate experimentally a theory of 
software certification that proceeds from assessment of 
confidence in fault-freeness (due to standards) to 
conservative prediction of failure-free operation.  
1.  Introduction  
The quality required of safety-critical software is such that 
faults are not expected to be revealed by post-construction 
assurance processes, nor are failures expected in operation. 
Hence, we cannot expect to evaluate standards for software 
assurance by measuring reductions in faults or failures. Before 
we can frame testable hypotheses about standards, we therefore 
need to posit a larger hypothesis that evidence for absence of 
faults provides the quantifiable basis for certification.  
2.  A Theory of Certification  
The world is an uncertain place, so safety require-ments 
are expressed probabilistically: it must be very unlikely that 
the system will lead to harm—and the more serious the 
harm, the less likely it must be. These likelihoods may be 
expressed in terms of probability of failure on demand (pfd ), 
as rates of failure, or in terms of total exposure. We will use 
the latter, which, for the case of commercial aircraft, is 
expressed by requirements such as “no catastrophic failure 
condition shall be expected to occur in the entire lifetime of 
all aircraft of one type.”  
It might then seem that the purpose of standards and 
assurance for safety-critical software should be to deliver direct 
guarantees that this or similar goals are satisfied. However, a 
little reflection shows that software assurance cannot, and does 
not, accom-plish this direct demonstration. Failure is a dynamic 
concept—that is, it concerns the behavior of software in 
execution—and probabilistic claims about failure concern 
repeated executions. But software assurance is largely 
comprised of static forms of analysis: for exam-ple, examination 
of requirements, specifications, and 
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code, and traceability among these. These analyses can discover 
faults and thereby improve software quality and reliability butit 
is not expected that any faults will be detected during system 
assurance: if they were, it would cast serious doubt on the 
development process. But if the value of assurance is not in 
revealing faults, how does it connect to failures and their 
probabilities? The answer is that it does so indirectly: assurance 
gives us confidence that faults are rare and from this we infer 
that the probability of failure will be low also. But how can we 
quantify this purported relationship?  
We do more assurance for software with more stringent 
failure requirements (e.g., DO178C specifies 71 assurance 
“objectives” for Level A software, vs. 69 for Level B, 62 for 
Level C, and 26 for Level D) and the purpose of doing more 
assurance must be to make us more confident—but 
confident about what? We can imagine two answers: more 
assurance makes us confident in fewer faults and thereby a 
lower probability of failure (i.e., more assurance changes 
what we are confident about); or, it makes us more confident 
in a given rarity of faults and an associated probability of 
failure (i.e., it increases our confidence in a single, fixed, 
property). The first might seem more intuitive but it is a 
special case of the second that delivers a tractable theory.  
The special case is software that is believed to be 
entirely free of faults (of kinds that could lead to failures 
of the severity under consideration). That is, more 
assurance makes us more confident that the soft-ware is 
fault-free and our degree of confidence can be expressed 
as a probability, namely P (s/w fault-free). By the 
formula for total probability  
P (s/w fails [on a randomly selected demand]) (1)  
= P (s/w fails j s/w fault-free)  P (s/w fault-free)  
 
+ P (s/w fails j s/w faulty)  P (s/w faulty):   
The first term in this sum is zero, because the software does 
not fail if it is fault-free (which is why the theory needs this 
property). Hence, if we define pnf as the 
probability the software is fault-free (or nonfaulty, so  
that P (s/w faulty) = 1 pnf ), and pF jf as the proba-bility 
that it Fails, if faulty, then pfd = pF jf (1 pnf ):  
More importantly, psrv (n), the probability of sur-
viving n independent demands (e.g., flights) without 
failure is given by 
 
psrv (n) = pnf + (1  pnf )  (1  pF jf )
n
:  (2) 
 
A suitably large n can represent “the entire lifetime of all 
aircraft of one type.” The notable feature of (2) is that the 
first term establishes a lower bound for psrv (n) that is 
independent of n. Thus, if software assurance gives us the 
confidence to assess, say, pnf > 0:99 (or whatever threshold 
“not expected to occur” means) then it looks like we have 
sufficient evidence to certify the aircraft as safe (with respect 
to software aspects).  
But certifiers (and the public) will also want guar-antees 
in case the software does have faults. Thus, we need 
confidence that the second term in (2), which decays 
exponentially, will be well above zero. This confidence 
could come from prior failure-free operation (e.g., flight 
tests). Calculating the overall psrv (n) can then be posed as a 
problem in Bayesian inference: we have assessed a value for 
pnf , have observed some number r of failure-free demands, 
and want to predict the probability of seeing n r future 
failure-free demands. To do this, we need a prior distribution 
for pF jf , which may be difficult to ob-tain, and difficult to 
justify for certification. However, there is a distribution that 
delivers provably worst-case predictions (specifically, one in 
which pF jf is concentrated in a probability mass at some qn 
2 (0; 1]) [1] so we can make predictions that are guaranteed 
to be conservative given only pnf , r, and n. For values  
of pnf above 0:9, we find that psrv (n) is well above the 
floor given by pnf , provided r > 10
n
 .  
If we regard a complete flight as a demand, then n might 
be as large as 10
8
–10
9
 (e.g., the Airbus A320 series have 
already performed over 62 million flights), but flight tests 
prior to certification might provide only r = 10
3
, so it looks 
as if these are insufficient for certification by the criterion 
above. However, it can be argued that when an aircraft type 
is certified, we do not require (and in fact cannot feasibly 
obtain) sufficient evidence to predict failure-free operation 
over the entire lifetime of the type; instead, we initially 
require sufficient confidence for only, say, the first six 
months of operation and the small number of aircraft that 
will be deployed in that period. This will be a much smaller 
value of n, and our pnf (from assurance) and our r (from 
flight tests) will be sufficient for confidence in its failure-
free operation. Then we will need confidence 
in the next six months of operation, with a larger fleet, (i.e., 
a larger n) but now have the experience of the prior six 
months failure-free operation (i.e., a larger r) and in this way 
we can “bootstrap” our way forward. 
 
3.  Suggested Experiments 
 
We contend that the account of the previous section 
provides the first scientific explanation for the way software 
certification in some industries (particularly commercial 
aviation) actually works: that is, it pro-vides a model for beliefs 
and their quantification that explains and is consistent with 
current practice.  
The hypotheses we propose to examine are (a) do the 
numbers work, and (b) do certifiers find the account 
plausible—to the extent that it can be used as a foundation 
on which to improve future practice?  
For the first, we need to ask what values of pnf can 
reasonably be assessed for the various DO-178C Soft-ware 
Levels. Two approaches are: (i) ask certifiers what pnf , cast in a 
frequentist interpretation, they might assess for each group of 
objectives: e.g., “given 100 software systems assessed to have 
accomplished all 7 objectives of DO-178C Section 6.3.2, how 
many of those systems do you believe might ever suffer a soft-
ware failure due to flawed low level requirements?”; (ii) 
consider how many such systems have been in use and never 
exhibited such failures. Both approaches have (different) 
weaknesses, but allow construction of a first-cut plausible 
argument, e.g., using Bayesian Belief Nets and suitable 
conservative simplifications, to yield assessment of pnf for the 
whole of DO-178C.  
We will also build models for the growth in fleet 
size over time and the “bootstrapping” of confidence 
in future failure-free operation (i.e., as r and n 
increase) for representative values of pnf .  
For hypothesis (b), we will present the model, peer-
reviewed and populated with “plausible” data from (a), to 
certifiers. If they accept the structure of the argument then we 
may proceed to investigate methods by which its parameters, the 
pnf values, can be based rigorously on evidence. Possible 
approaches include analysis of the assurance case underlying the 
objectives of DO-178C and of means for accomplishing them. 
Further explorations could include modified objectives and 
alternative means (e.g., software monitors) to support 
assessment of high pnf , enhancing psrv (n). 
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